Tactics (Gregory Koukl)

Koukl, Gregory. Tactics: A Game Plan for Discussing Your Christian Convictions.  Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, [2019].

We want to be like Jesus.  That sounds pious enough.  But do we debate like Jesus?  The answer, especially for us apologists, is certainly ‘no.’  We want to be mighty, heroically casting down intellectual strongholds, usually identified as the teenage barista at Starbucks.  Yes, that language is from Paul, but he probably did not have our style in mind.  Even if we win the debate, we often lose the person.  Sometimes that might be called for, but Greg Koukl reminds us of a more effective manner of defending and presenting the faith:  the way Jesus did.

Be gentle, but stay in the driver’s seat.

1. No tension

2. Ask specific questions

3. Look for logical consequences

Somewhat paradoxically, if you are in the driver’s seat, your conversation partner will be doing most of the intellectual work. There are so many advantages to this approach.  It gives the other person the impression, we hope a true one, that he is being heard and understood.  It reinforces the fact that we are after truth, or should be.

Hitting the Road

Three skills needed:

1. Basic knowledge

2. Wisdom; spiritual street smarts.

3. character

When we are challenged, the mind, not the Bible, is our first line of defense.  This is not an attack or diminishing of the Bible.  Before one can even use the Bible, he must first use the laws of logic to formulate the proposition.  This is what the historic Reformed called the order of knowing.  It follows, not precedes, the order of being, which is God. And when two or more people disagree about the Bible, it is logic, the ability to discern true thinking from false thinking, that decides the issue.  Learning to reason and argue properly is a virtue, as it protects one from religious despotism (among other things).

Key principle: “Without God’s work, nothing else work; but with God’s work, many things work” (Koukl 45). This is a fine restatement of the principle that God’s sovereignty works through human means.  God blesses the use of reason for his kingdom. To say otherwise is to be a hyper-Calvinist pietist.

*The Columbo Tactic*

Koukl recommends responding to challenges by asking questions.  A question disarms the person, gains information, and allows progress in dialogue (58-59).  If the questions are well-placed, they allow you to remain in the driver’s seat.

The First Question:  “What do you mean by that?” As Koukl notes, many objections to the faith trade on muddled thinking (66). With more thoughtless objections, such clarifying questions will often be sufficient.

*Columbo Step Two*: Reversing the Burden of Proof

In other words, make the other person give evidence or reasons for his view.  Koukl recommends doing this, asking, “How did you come to that conclusion?” (80) or “where did you get your facts?”  He makes a further good point: resist the urge to refute everything your opponent says.  “It’s not your job (at this point) to defeat his claim. It’s his job to defend it.”  Make distinctions between possible, plausible, and probable.

*The Professor’s Ploy*

If you are in a situation where your opponent has the microphone or some other position of power, do not directly engage him.  The man with the microphone always wins the debate.  As is true in warfare, so also in debate: never make a frontal assault on an entrenched, superior force.

Rather, begin with a variation of the first Columbo question.  Then ask him how he came to his conclusions.  If he truly does not have reasons for his position, other students will notice.  That is just as effective as refuting him.  These questions serve another function: by clarifying what he believes, and what he believes you believe, then you keep him from strawmanning your own view.

In other words, when someone makes a controversial claim “and then says, ‘You prove me wrong,’ don’t play their game. Don’t let them make you do they work they should be doing(90).”

*Getting out of the hot seat*

What happens if someone knows more than you?  Your only lifeline at this is point are questions. They can help you regain control of the conversation, or at worst buy you some time.  If you know you are about to be beaten, simply say, “That sounds interesting. Let me think about it.”

At the end of the conversation, narrate the debate.  Describe the discussion to the person. This allows you to steer the conversation.

*Columbo Step Three: Use Questions to make a point*

This next tactic, though crucial, requires some skill and practice.  A good series of questions can connect the dots for the listener.  This also allows you to navigate politically dangerous situations.  Let’s say someone, perhaps a coworker or a boss, is a homosexual and asks you your view on marriage.  Koukl recommends responding in the following way:

“You know, this is actually a very personal question.  I don’t mind answering, but before I do, I want to know if it’s safe to offer my views.  So let me ask you a question first: do you consider yourself a tolerant person or an intolerant person on issues like this? Is it safe to give my opinion, or are you going to judge me for my point of view? Do you respect diverse points of view, or do you condemn others for having convictions that differ from your own” (100)?

This is the same format Jesus used against the Pharisees regarding baptism from heaven.

*Conclusion*

This is easily the best book on evangelism I have ever read.  It is also the best beginner book on apologetics.  This series of questions is very effective, but there is a danger.  Several, actually.  They will not work every time.  You will run into someone who is smarter than you and a better debater.  You will lose.  That will happen.  It will not happen that often, though.  Most people, Christians included, really have not thought about the reasons for the reasons they give.  The danger is you might become a sophist not unlike those in Plato’s day.  The cure for that is getting beaten in a debate.  See danger #1.

Koukl did not mention it, though, but this is the same tactic Plato used.  The reader is strongly encouraged to pick up Plato’s dialogues as a follow-up.  Not only are they fun to read, but they introduce the reader to key problems in epistemology.

Key quotes:

“It is not the Christian life to wound, embarrass, or play one-upmanship with colleagues, friends or even opponents, but it’s a common vice that anyone can easily fall into–Hugh Hewitt.”

A Bibliography of a Classical Warrior

(To be updated as time goes on)

The country western singer Alan Jackson urged one to “Walk on the Rocks/That I stumbled on.” I take the same approach to recommending books: read the foundational works first, and then move outward. At all costs, at least at the early stages, avoid current movements (even good ones). Find the best authors in a field and read everything they wrote. This usually (though not always) means older authors.

My entire philosophy of education is drawn from Mortimer Adler’s project. If you can get a copy of his Syntopicon, that will teach you everything you need to know. Definitely start with How to Read a Book.

With the exception of St Augustine, this list will not include theology. I have written enough about that elsewhere.

Classical History

Pride of place goes to Herodotus’s Histories. His accuracy is sometimes suspect, but he is (rightly) the first to which one turns. I have the Penguin edition.

The most important history, however, is Thucydides. In fact, it is also the most important book on war ever written. He is relevant in every age. I read the Oxford World Classics edition, though one might want to check the Landmark Thucydides.

I have not read Livy in great detail, though it is safe to say he should be on any list.

Philosophy

Plato, His dialogues. The point in reading Plato is to learn how to talk with people. I do not actually endorse his philosophy. He is just a fun writer.

Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics. This is the primary text on the good life. His politics is worth reading, too, but NE is exponentially better.

Politics

On What the Great Tradition Isn’t

I have tried to show that the Great Tradition is more of a conversation than a database of pre-interpreted doctrines. As such, there is more weight on the doctrine of God and Christ than on Baptism. The Great Tradition aims more at the question: “Given what they believe about reality, why did they see the text or doctrine this way?”

1.Christian Platonism is a terrible moniker. I’ve read all of Plato’s writings and though it is fun to watch Socrates troll people, Plato qua Plato has problems.
2. What Carter and others mean, though, is simply metaphysical Augustinianism. If you are a historically-minded Western Christian, this is you. You might not like it, but this is probably what you default to.
3. That means things like Truth and Goodness really exist and aren’t simply names.
4. I don’t like allegory, but I have not yet seen them say they affirm the fourfold method. I could be wrong, though. Typology, by contrast, is the answer. Typology is rooted in historical realities.
5. It is possible to give too much credence to tradition. That’s not really what modern Americans are guilty of. The opposite error is also likely.
6. Even though I believe metaphysical realism is true, not all realisms are the same. Plato’s view of the soul is not the same as Aquinas’s.
7. The Great Tradition is probably more amenable to Augustine’s view of “Signs/Things” as discussed in On Christian Doctrine.

Nor is this “Thomism.” There are similarities between Thomas and the Great Tradition. However, Thomas would not accept Plato’s view of the soul, for one.

Platonic realism sees universals floating in some abstract realm. A universal is what you predicate of something else. The problem is that many Platonists also want to see the universal as some kind of substance itself, and it is hard to have both. Aristotle and Aquinas, by contrast, said the universal is in the thing iteself. A substance is form + something else (usually matter).

For example, Plato (and probably Augustine) believed the soul was a substance in the body. A ghost in the machine. Aquinas, on the other hand, believed the soul was the form of the body. It in-formed the body. That’s closer to the biblical position of a more holistic person.

As to my being a Thomist, I accept the same Thomist distinctions that Owen did in volume 10. I accept the same Thomist outline that Zanchi did. I hold to a more Scotist view, however, ala Franciscus Junius, when it comes to the ectypal distinction.

Here is another example of why the Great Tradition never meant to determine what a doctrine could or could not mean. What does “participation” (methexis) mean? For example, a sacramentum participates in the res. Paul alludes to the idea when he talks about our participation/sharing in the body of Christ. So on one level, participation means sharing. When Irenaeus, Ambrose, and Augustine use participation, how does it practically function?

If someone wants to criticize Platonism “from within,” read Plato’s dialogue Parmenides. It’s the only dialogue where Socrates actually loses the match. Platonism gets punched in the face pretty hard. Part of it is difficult, but it’s no more challenging than reading Van Til.

One could probably make the argument that even if Plato didn’t reject the doctrine of the Forms, his later writings are aware of the criticisms of them. That’s why we see a movement from the Philosopher King to a more humble approach to rule by law.

The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative (Frei)

Frei, Hans. The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Frei investigates the breakdown between story and reality, realistic and figural interpretation. His Yale post-liberal presuppositions aid his analysing German liberalism. Unfortunately, tyalehey do not help him construct a coherent alternative.

A realistic interpretation is a strict correspondence between word and reality. There can only be one meaning: that of the author. This is problematic when one approaches biblical prophecy: were the prophets’ intended meanings the same as that of the New Testament readers? At this point the realistic paradigm breaks down.

A figural reading is close to Reformed typology: the narrated sequence contains its own meaning (Frei 28). While Frei doesn’t draw the explicit conclusion, if typology is true, then one must also employ a narratival epistemology. One will note this is standard Protestant–especially Reformed covenantal–hermeneutics. So what happened in history, especially in Germany? The blossoming liberal schools quite correctly saw that if typology is true, then the bible has a coherent unity. If the bible has a coherent unity, then it forces a narratival epistemology. If that is true, then dualisms of a Platonic or Kantian sort are ruled out.

“What if Plato were a German Liberal?”

The development of hermeneutics didn’t take place in a vacuum. Scholars were interacting with contemporary philosophical shfits. The liberal schools would not accept a realistic hermeneutics because it was obvious (for them) that miracles and resurrection were not part of “reality.” They could not accept a typological reading because typology is at war with internalized, spiritual pious gush.

Schleiermacher’s comments are appropriate at this point. His denial of the Resurrection and the miraculous is well-known, but perhaps not his reasons why. They are several: if the truth of the story is in the event, then it stands or falls apart from my internalized spiritualization of the text. Further, if the goal of Jesus (on the liberal gloss) is his coming-to-realization of God-conciousness, then the Resurrection makes such reading pointless. Indeed, the cross is an anti-climax.

Lessons to be learned: A Conclusion of sorts

It’s not clear if Frei himself avoids all of the criticisms of liberal theology. His distinction between factuality and factuality-like probably won’t hold up under scrutiny (which is why few liberals adopted it). His understanding of narrative theology is brilliant, but narrative theology only works if the narrative is…well..real. Did it actually happen?

If we do not have eschatology as the corresponding pole to history, as none of the liberals did, then it is hard to avoid D. F. Strauss’s criticisms. If the goal of hermeneutics is eternal, timeless truths (ironically shared by both modern Evangelicals and Schleiermacher), then Lessing’s ditch is insurmountable. If truth is Platonic and necessary and eternal, necessary because it is eternal, then why bother with historical contingencies like narratives? If this is the case, Lessing is absolutely correct.

Volume 2 of the Syntopicon (Adler)

Mortimer Adler regularly claimed that it was impossible to be educated before the age of 40.  If true, I would also suggest it is difficult to be educated without working through something like his Syntopicon.  The setup is the same as the earlier volume.    There is a ten page essay, topical indexes, and a recommended reading list.  This review will only outline his key topics, the various positions taken, and how the great thinkers interacted with their predecessors, if time permits.

Man

Man is the only subject where the knower and the object known are the same (Adler 1).  Indeed, “the human intellect is able to examine itself.”

The Western tradition is divided on man’s essence.  The standard (and correct) view is that man differs from animals because he is rational.  His use of speech is a consequence of this rationality.  It is not the main difference.  If this is true, then there must be some distinction between reason and sense (5).

Mind

The mind is capable of self-knowledge. This is the difference between sense and intellect.  Senses do not seem to be aware of themselves (172). 

Following Aristotle, we see that if “the soul is the principle of life and all vital activities, so mind is the subordinate principle of knowledge” (173).  And the act of intellect moves as such:

1) conception
2) judgment
3) reasoning.

Monarchy

Adler wisely separates the principle of absolute government from monarchy, since republics and democracies can be as absolutist (205). Monarchy as an idea underwent a transformation in the Middle Ages. It did resemble an absolute system in one sense by giving power to one man, yet it placed supremacy of law in the hands of the people (207).  The only problem with this idea is that given its birth in feudalism, it did not last long in the modern age.

Hegel suggests a robust constitutional monarchy.  In this view the state is more of a corporation. The advantage of this view is that it is quite flexible with modernity and market forces  It doesn’t have any of the disadvantages that plagued medieval models.  On the other hand, it’s not always clear what Hegel is saying.

One and the Many

In line with Aristotle, unity is the first property of being.  All contraries are reducible to things like being/nonbeing, one/many, etc.  Moreover, unity belongs to the individual natural substance.  Man is a substance.  He is not made of other substances.  Machines, though, are.

This is somewhat different from Plato.  Plato’s view had problems.  The idea of the one is also one idea among many.  Plotinus corrected some of these problems.  For him, the one transcends being.  It also transcends intelligence, since knowing requires an object, which would introduce duality into the One.

Opposition

Opposites do not simply distinguish, they exclude.

Plato: Everything has one opposite.  This was his idea in Gorgias and Protagoras on the unity of virtue.  This also illustrates the numerous subdivisions in Western taxonomies.

Aristotle: made the distinction between correlative opposites (double, one-half) and contrary opposites (odd/even).

Hegel: Unites opposites by reconciling their differences.  Every finite phase of reality has its own contrary.  For example, being and nonbeing imply and exclude one another.  They are united in becoming.

Reasoning

The words “if” and “then” indicate that reason is a motion of the mind from one alternative to another.

Plotinus: any form of thinking signifies a weakness.  It introduces duality.  Higher intelligences, by contrast, know by intuition.  Later Christian thinkers didn’t accept this extreme a view, but they did borrow his idea on intuition and applied it to angelic intelligences.

All the praise I gave of volume one also applies to this volume.

Parmenides (Plato)

It’s not a good feeling you get when you go to the article on this dialogue at plato.stanford.edu and the author says, “This is his most enigmatic dialogue.”  Much of it, though, is quite interesting and fairly easy to follow.  Plato explains his Forms and the standard responses to his view.

Problem: how can the whole Idea, being one, be participated in by man?

If something participates in an Idea, does it participate in part of the Idea or the whole?  The One cannot be a whole, since wholes have parts and the One can’t have parts, otherwise it wouldn’t be One. From here Plato’s interlocutors discuss the metaphysics of the One, which is interesting for Christians on how we gloss God’s simplicity.

The One can’t have beginning or end, since those are limits and it is unlimited.  Neither can the One have motion, since motion is a coming to be in one place or another.  This is the same reason the One cannot change, since change is motion.

The One is also above time, since it cannot participate in time (as that would compromise its unicity).

This was a very difficult dialogue, but it is mandatory reading for understanding Plato’s metaphysics.  It also introduces the main problem against Plato: the Third Man Argument.

Protagoras (Plato)

This is a complete masterpiece of rhetoric.  It ranks with Gorgias and often surpasses the Republic in terms of logical focus.  All educators should read it.  Plato reminds us that we cannot separate Being, Rhetoric, and Goodness. Whatever you learn, you take into your soul.

That’s how the dialogue begins.  It doesn’t retain that level of intensity as Socrates routinely gets sidetracked.  Another point to keep in mind: while Protagoras is known for saying “Man is the measure of all things,” that’s not what this dialogue is about.  

I always wondered why Socrates was so insistent that virtue cannot be taught, for it seems obvious that it can.  What he argues, I think, and the same problem arises in Euthydemus, is that you can’t just pay money to hear a few lectures by a huckster and then say you are virtuous. (Have you ever noticed how postmodern university courses on ethics never make people virtuous?).

Socrates and Protagoras spend the rest of the dialogue debating whether virtue is of a whole or if it can be parceled out in pieces?  For example, both justice and courage are virtues.  Do we say that the unjust man can be courageous?  It seems like he can.  I suppose the question we should then ask, which neither Socrates nor Protagoras ask, is whether his courage flows from his injustice, and that is obviously no.  Yet this seems to give the nod to Protagoras that they can be distinguished.

Socrates then reframes the argument:  if everything has an opposite, and wisdom and temperance aren’t the same thing, then they can’t be parts of virtue, for then virtue would have a contradiction.  I think this is a better argument on Socrates’s part, but I think it was up to Aristotle to give the final say on it.  What Socrates needs is some kind of cipher like the later model of divine simplicity and then apply that to the virtues.  He ends the debate by suggesting–and only suggesting–that knowledge is this kind of cipher that unifies the virtues.

Theaetetus (Plato)

Plato returns to his criticism of Protagoras’s claim that man is the measure of all things.  Granted that such an argument is wrong (and silly), we explore the nature of knowledge and why it can’t be sense impression.

Theaetetus has just come back from the Sophists who argue that knowledge = sense perception.  The larger context is Protagoras’s claim that “man is the measure of all things.” We will call this claim (P). We will distinguish this from Theaetetus’s claim that knowledge is perception, called (T).

Socrates asks him that if (T) is true, then knowledge must also be perceiving, to which Theaetetus agrees. If this is true, then a thing’s appearing-to-me must also be a thing’s being or existence.  Our claim now entails that such knowledge is unerring (since it is connected with being).  This, however, is manifestly false. Case in point: we perceive things in dreams, but no one thinks dreams are real.

Theaetetus retreats from this claim and attacks from the Heraclitean point of view that “motion is the source of being.”  Flux, not stability is primary.  There is no self-existent thing.  Everything is becoming and in relation. He has the nice phrase “Partisans of the perpetual flux.”  Indeed, we can’t even say man or stone, but only an aggregate of x.  This is word-for-word Karl Marx (Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, Thesis VI).

Let’s return to (P). If it is true, then there is no reason to believe that Protagoras (or the modern university professor) is correct. If knowledge is sensation, and I can’t discern another man’s sensation, and yet Protagoras purports to be true, then why prefer him to anyone else?  This was the first response to postmodernism long before postmodernism came on the scene.

Another problem: I can have knowledge from memory, yet memory isn’t a sense.

Another problem: I can have knowledge of abstract entities and categories, yet these aren’t present to the senses.

Let’s return to the Heraclitean claim.  If nothing is at rest, and everything is supervening upon everything else, then every answer is equally right, since all we have are moving targets.

There is yet another diversion where Socrates explains that the soul perceives some things by herself and others by means of bodily organs. The soul has something like “wax” in it that handles the impressions.  If a soul is deep and virtuous, then the impressions sink to the heart of the soul.

The dialogue ends with discussions of justified, true belief.

Arguably the most important of his “epistemology” dialogues, it is somewhat a difficult read as Socrates goes through numerous diversions.

Beauty for Truth’s Sake (Caldecott)

Caldecott, Stratford.  On the Re-enchantment of Education. Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2009.

Argument: We must go back to Plato through Boethius and Augustine.  Our goal, however, is not Plato, but Pythagoras.  That last name separates this book from all others on classical education.  Caldecott’s argument, though, is straightforward.  If the universe is an ordered cosmos (implying, among other things, a harmonic structure), then we have to deal with Pythagoras.

The book borders on sheer genius.  I say that partly because I have no clue on how to classify it.  I’ve seen it promoted among classical school educators, and that certainly makes sense, but even then it isn’t clear how the book would be integrated into a day-to-day classical school classroom.

I wouldn’t even call this “classical education.”  It is simply, as he notes, “liberal arts.” The point of the quadrivium is to enable us to contemplate God and the harmonic nature of the universe.

One of our goals in education is to transmit a culture. If we let education become fragmented into disciplines, we communicate that education is simply bits and pieces that we can choose (Caldecott 17).   By contrast, the keys to meaning are always form, interiority, beauty, relationship, and purpose.

Ancient man as knowing man: The ancient man, presumably following Socrates, understood that it is the nature of man to know. This “knowledge can only be obtained through the systematic ordering of the soul” (21).

Four levels of Platonic knowledge:

Reason — Nous
Understanding
Opinion
Perception of shadows

Point: the instrument of knowledge must be a turning of the whole soul from becoming to being (22). Plato believed that the trivium is the tool to awaken us to the inner vision of the soul.

Caldecott realizes we can’t simply drop the quadrivium on students today.  Even in the middle ages, it struggled to integrate new knowledge.  Further, students would probably be better off studying medieval, rather than ancient, literature (or both). He argues that we must teach these advanced maths and sciences from a history of ideas standpoint (28).

Object of Education

It is difficult to summarize education into one single purpose.  Each angle, though, sheds light on the whole:

Socrates: The purpose of education is to love what is beautiful.  Beauty for Socrates was something objective.

Poetic Education

A child studies music and harmony at a more mature age in order to have his soul geared towards such a proportion.

Education and Number

Following Pythagoras, he suggests number is a facet of the Unity (Father) projected through Duality (mother) to create multiplicity (55).

One: Unity of being, often depicted by a circle.  When it is squared it is still itself.

Two: Duality; separation of male and female, matter and spirit. It is a line between two points.

Three: Unity and diversity are reconciled in harmony.  Depicted by a triangle within a circle.

Four: First solid number.  Represents earth or the material plane. In the four elements, earth and fire (contraction and expansion, respectively) are opposed to each other. Water and air mediate.

Five: As it is the midpoint within the Decad, it symbolizes the human.

Six: Perfect number as it is the sum and product of its divisors. Represented by a regular hexagon.

Seven: Totality. It is the sum of four (the material world) and three (the Trinity).

Golden Ratio

This is the essence of beauty and probably the key to unlocking the universe.

Phi = whole/large part = large part/small part

1.61804/1

He takes these harmonies and applies it to the Trinity.  By itself that isn’t wrong.  However, you are getting on dangerous ground when you have the Son participating in both deity and humanity.  The Son has these natures.  He does not merely participate in them.  

Fun fact: early Platonists anticipated the octave by the shape of the letter lamda.  “The musical scale was a model of the cosmos” (92).
Criticisms:

In the middle of an excellent discussion on beauty, Caldecott says in a footnote that he does not wish to deny the beauty in modern and postmodern works (32 n28).  This beggars belief.  There is no beauty in postmodern works.  It is trash.  Literally.  Some of it is pieces of garbage glued together.

Caldecott follows an amazing section on numbers with the Trinity.  He tries to tie in certain number theories with Trinity and defend, among other things, the Filioque.  I’m not saying his arguments are wrong, but they do seem out of place.

The book is written from a Roman Catholic perspective, so readers should be aware of that.

Dugin’s Genealogy of Modernity

Earlier notes on Dugin

The Beginning and End of Western European Philosophy

The Greek take on Being leads to the oblivion of Being.

Being–beings-as-a-whole–is replaced by the notion (Vorstellung) of it.  This notion then becomes more disconnected and mechanical (92)

“Thought.”  Differentiation is the main attribute of thought.

The Pre-Socratics took the obvious claim that “beings” are, but they then sought to find what was the “Being” of beings, and they interpreted this as phusis (99).  This means that Being now is. Now Being (Sein) precedes beings and is different from them.

Plato

Being is now an Idea. It is that which is placed before man (106).  That’s Dugin’s language and I don’t think it is the clearest. This is one of those times where German could be clear.  Ideas function in a gegenstand relationship with Man. That’s not all, though. Not only does man stand before Ideas, but Ideas stand before things of the world (107).

Maybe we can say it this way:  Ideas are always across from man.  There is a “gap.” Man is always “before” (across) the ideas.  Thus Heidegger’s conclusion: man (being) is no longer in the world, but across from it.  Man is pre-sented before the world, which means Ideas have to be re-presented to him. Truth is now correspondence between Idea and Object.

I’ll skip Heidegger’s section on Christianity.  For all of his genius, he is utterly incompetent on this point.  If all he had to say was that Thomas Aquinas helped with the oblivion of being, then fine.  But he didn’t understand Semitic thought, nor did he want to. Thus when Yahweh says “I am that I am,” Heidegger just thinks it means Being qua Being.

Descartes

Descartes adapted but never left Plato.  In Modernity instead of Plato’s Idea we have new “representations: the subject, apperception, energy, reality, the monad, etc.” (114). Descartes starts with the Subject.  This subject either is or inside the human mind.

Everything is is re-presented before the Subject.  Descartes calls these beings objects (115). A subject must have an object to stand before it. Modernity will then use Scientism to function as the subject.  This means that Scientism now controls the objects before it, which could be anything from plants to animals to humans.