Philosophy for Dummies (Tom Morris)

Morris, Tom.  Philosophy for Dummies.

Its title notwithstanding, or perhaps because of its title and format, this is the best introductory text to philosophy that I have read. It is not entirely a basic philosophy text, nor is it a philosophy of religion text. It is a mixture of both. It covers basic issues like knowledge and metaphysics, while exploring challenges to theistic belief.

Tom Morris, former philosophy professor at Notre Dame and author of classics such as Our Idea of God and Logic of God Incarnate, brings philosophy down to the bottom shelf, so to speak.  As with all of Morris’s new books, this could not be boring if it tried.  This book divides the topic along the standard lines of Philosophy of Religion, the early chapters covering issues such as epistemology. After dealing with knowledge and ethics, Morris explores the existence of God, the problem of the afterlife, free will, and the soul. Some of it, particularly the section on Pascal, can be found in other works.  Accordingly, his treatment on the existence and nature of God, while excellent, can be found in Our Idea of God, which you should read.

While the book is from a Christian theistic perspective, Morris alerts the reader, and readers of all persuasions, to the various options and challenges on each topic.

Belief, Truth, and Knowledge

In terms of epistemology, Morris follows the standard model of knowledge as justified, true belief.  Unlike some treatments of knowledge, Morris explains, perhaps in ways Plato could not always do, the connection between knowledge and behavior, as seen in the following equation:   Belief + Desires = Actions.  Knowledge is an “attainment” (46).  “Believing is an activity; knowing is the intended result.”

Challenge of Skepticism

Knowledge, particularly as defined above, is simple–perhaps too simple. As Esther Lightcap Meek noted in Longing to Know, if Western philosophy was birthed in Platonism, its cradle was skepticism. Why do you believe what you believe?  As Morris notes, “All of your beliefs about the past depend upon testimony,  memory, or both, or else by sense-experience, augmented by testimony and memory” (63). But that is a problem: How do you know testimony and memory are reliable? We normally try to answer this question by appealing to our own memory to justify our memory, but this is circular reasoning.

In other words, you cannot logically prove that you did not come into existence five minutes ago with pre-formed memories.  How can one respond to that?  Morris gives us a tool: the principle of belief conservation.

“For any proposition, P: If

1. Taking a certain cognitive stance toward P…would require rejecting or doubting a vast number of your current beliefs, and
2. You have no independent positive reason to reject or doubt all those other beliefs, and
3. You have no compelling reason to take up that cognitive stance toward P” (80).

Therefore,

“Sense experience, memory, testimony, and our basic-belief forming mechanisms are sometimes reliable” (83).

We can turn the tables on the skeptic:  “Sure, I cannot prove I am older than five minutes, but you have given me no reason to think your position is correct. You cannot simply say, ‘Here is an outlandish claim, now prove me wrong.’”  

We can also use “William James’ ‘Pre-formative faith.’” James argues that we have a rational warrant to sometimes go beyond the evidence “if the chance to so believe is a genuine option” (86). This is how detectives work. It is also how crossword puzzles work.

What is the Good?

Most people believe that there is an objective right and wrong–at least they do when they are treated unfairly, as C. S. Lewis eloquently stated.  One challenge to this view is Non-cognitivism: there is no objective good.  Value statements like “x is bad” only reflect my personal preference, basically saying “x boo!” It is open to several devastating defeaters.  It gets rid of all moral disagreement.  If someone is pro-choice and the other is pro-life, the non-cognitivist says they are not actually disagreeing about a fact, but this is silly. Moreover, as Morris asks, “Why do people cheer or jeer a proposition?” It is because a position is right or wrong.

Teleological Target Practice

According to Aristotle, “Something is good when it successfully hits the target for which it was intended” (quoted in Morris, 102). Morris does not bring it out, but this is similar to the claim made by Hebraic philosophers like Yoram Hazony and Dru Johnson that an object is “true” when it fulfills its purpose.  For example, a true path is one that gets me to my destination.

Happiness and the Good Life

Four Dimensions of Human Experience

Similar to his If Aristotle Ran General Motors, Morris sees four dimensions of the human experience: Truth, Goodness, Beauty + the Spiritual. The first three, if not self-evident, are at least familiar.  By contrast, the spiritual dimension aims to capture our deep need for the following: Unique, Union, Usefulness, and Understanding.

Ethical Rules and Moral Character

Hume was wrong to say all ethics is feeling, but he did capture an important point, one that Morris notes: “It is precisely people devoid of natural sentiment, that affection of fellow-feeling so natural to most, who commit heinous crimes and immoral acts” (130).

Character: the settled set of dispositions and habits (131ff).

Wisdom: An embodied form of deep understanding, or insight, into how things really are, and how then you ought to live.

Virtue: the strength or ongoing habit to act in accordance with wisdom.

7 Cs of Success

Conception, Confidence, Concentration, Consistency, Commitment, Character, and Capacious Enjoyment.

This material is found in his Art of Achievement.  We will focus on conception. Conception has a telos or goal.  A “telos” is a target we can shoot at.  This is a clear conception of what we want. In order to have clear goals, we need to set them with our self-knowledge in mind.  As Morris notes, “Goal setting is an exercise in self-knowledge.”

Pascal and a Life Worth Meaning

Taken from material in Making Sense of It All, Morris gives us not an argument for the existence of God but an argument for the existence of meaning in life. To make a crude oversimplification, it is an argument, not only for living, but even for business. A good wager will account for “expected value” (112ff).

(EV): (Probability x Payoff) – Cost = Expected Value.

Morris gives the following example.  Gold (a horse) has a ⅔ probability of winning with a payoff of $300.  Placing a bet costs sixty dollars. Silver, by contrast, “pays nine hundred dollars, and to bet on this horse costs only $20” (112-113). Even with only a ⅓ probability of winning, Silver is clearly the best bet.

The key strategy is not how much money I get at the end, but how I can quantify “the overall value of each bet.”

The goal here is not to get the person to believe in God.  Pascal, rather, is seeking to structure our actions, which can sometimes condition our beliefs.

Conclusion

I read this in a few sittings.  Philosophy aside, Morris has  numerous engaging and amusing anecdotes.  This actually would be a good book for a Freshman philosophy class.  Barring that, it is a good resource for a thoughtful high school student.

Life’s Ultimate Questions by Ronald Nash

Nash, Ronald.  Life’s Ultimate Questions.

I think I have figured out the problem with “worldview.”  It was originally meant to be used as a tool.  We have turned it into an end-goal.  No, the situation is even worse.  We have turned it into a commodity.  That is why worldview talk today is basically useless.  We hear a lot about how “this is in conflict with a Christian worldview.” Rarely do we hear anything of how belief-forming mechanisms work or exactly why socialism always leads to shortages and gluts. It did not always have to be this way.  There was once a better way to talk about worldview analysis.  Ronald H. Nash offers one such model.

For the moment–maybe forever–let us put aside the term “worldview.”  We will use “system” instead.  Nash argues that the case for or against Christian theism should be made and evaluated in terms of total systems.  A system must meet several tests: the law of noncontradiction, outer experience, internal cohesion, and practice. Could there be more criteria?  Possibly, but the above are a good start.

Naturalism

A naturalist believes “the physical universe is the sum total of all there is.”  

The most intuitive problem with naturalism is the process of reasoning itself.  C.S. Lewis and most recently Alvin Plantinga point out that reasoning exceeds the bounds of nature, or at least it is not clear how biological reactions can create the law of non-contradiction.

Moreover, it seems naturalism reduces to physicalism, and this is a problem.  “If truth, a proposition, or a thought were some physical motion in the brain, no two persons could have the same thought.”

Plato

Nash updates Platonic language by speaking more of sets than forms.  This is a clear gain. We can now rephrase Plato to say “that every class of objects in the physical world has an archetype or a perfect pattern existing in the immutable, eternal, and immaterial world.”  We do not need to accept Plato’s conclusions–indeed, until we get to St. Augustine we are better off not accepting him–but he does provide the reader with a number of conceptual tools.  For example, “An essence is the set of essential properties without which a particular thing like this squirrel or that tree would not exist as a squirrel or tree.”

Plato’s realm of forms is too neat.  It works in some areas but not in others.  For example, “One could not know that a and b are equal unless he already knew the standard, Equal itself.”  We know universals prior to the particular.  Unfortunately, finding out how this knowledge arrives leads to some problems, namely reincarnation.

Aristotle

Our discussion of Aristotle will turn mainly on his definitions of terms, since much of Aristotle will be repeated in Aquinas. Nash summarizes Aristotle’s view of substance as “any given thing that exists or has being.” A substance is composed of matter and form, the latter being the “set of essential properties that makes it the kind of thing it is.”

An essential property is a property of x, which if it lost, x would cease to be x. A common property “is any property that  human beings [for example] typically possess without also being essential.”  For example, the property of having ten toes is common, but not essential.

Plotinus

Of all the ancient philosophers, Plotinus is easily the most interesting and most powerful.  

Main idea: the One necessarily expands downward.  The next level is the Nous, or the One’s thinking.  Then there is soul, and finally bodies or matter.

The One is so “one-ish” that attributing any property to it compromises its unity.  As Nash notes, “If we say ‘The One is x,’ we introduce dualism into the One via the distinction between subject and predicate.” Even saying the One is unknowable does not help, for already we seem to know quite a few things about the One.

If this One is “God,” then how do we relate to it?  As best one (sorry!) can tell, you can only relate to it by some mystical catching up into it.

Plotinus’s universe

Is Matter evil for Plotinus?  No.  It would be a mistake to call him a Gnostic.   Matter does represent some sort of fall in being, but that means it is less good rather than evil.

Augustine

Although much of this is familiar material, Nash has some helpful charts for explaining Augustine’s thought. Nash does a fine job explaining, for example, Augustine’s epistemology.  It is more than simply “faith seeking understanding.” It is illumination.  It is a correlation of being and knowing.

Illumination: God, Soul, and Sun

In a familiar metaphor, Augustine believes “God is to the soul what the sun is to the eye. God is not only the truth in, by, and through whom all truths are true….He is also the light in, by, and through whom all intelligible things are illumined.”

Aquinas

I am going to skip much of this thought.  Although presuppositionalists have done a uniformly terrible job at explaining Aquinas, Nash seems to get it right.  

The Law of Non-contradiction

Simply put, A cannot be B and ~B at the same time and in the same relationship.  

So far, so good.  B represents the class of all dogs (or humans).  Non-B is its complement, everything else in the universe that is not a dog. Nash explains by way of a lengthy quote from Gordon Clark:

“If contradictory statements are true of the same subject at the same time, evidently all things will be the same thing. Socrates will be a ship, a house, as well as a man. But if precisely the same attributes attach to Crito that attach to Socrates it follows that Socrates is Crito. Not only so, but the ship in the harbor, since it has the same list of attributes too, will be identified with this Socrates-Crito person. In fact, everything will be the same thing. All differences among things will vanish and all will be one.”

But does this apply to God?  Would not this reduce God to human logic? Nash responds:

“If God does operate according to a different logic, a higher logic in which B and non-B are indistinguishable, nothing would prevent God at the final judgment from announcing that there

is no difference between believers and nonbelievers and between God’s keeping and breaking his promises. But there is no need to get upset, because on such grounds there can also be no difference between heaven and hell.”

But one may still object that God may be internally contradictory, having his own sort of logic where the law of non-contradiction need not apply.  If that is true, then they could not know it, for communication presupposes this very law.

Possible Worlds

This is where it gets fun.  Before proceeding, one should define a number of terms.

Proposition: that which is expressed in a sentence’s meaning.

State of affairs: an inadequate definition would be that which obtains if a proposition is true.  It is better illustrated in the following diagram:

The above is fairly common sense.  Some pious Christians might balk at what follows: true propositions are eternal entities. This seems to follow from one’s definition of truth.  If truth is unchanging, then it seems to be eternal. Such truths would be in the mind of God.

Possible world: a possible world is a way the world could have been. All that one needs is for a state of affairs a) to be different and b) logically consistent.

Book: for every possible world, the book is the sum total of all true propositions.

Lest we get too excited, not every counterfactual state of affairs is a possible world.  More likely, it is only a slice of a possible world.

Lest this get too abstract, there is a very real pay-off: possible worlds allow us to define essential and non-essential properties, so necessary for Christology (to name but one example). An essential property is one that I possess in every possible world. Let’s apply this to discussions of God.

According to Nash, “A divine attribute then is a property that God could not lose and continue to be God; it is an essential property of God, existing in every possible world.

Epistemology

Nash, although a Clarkian of sorts, seems to hold to the correspondence theory of truth: “Truth is a property of propositions that correspond to the way things are.”

How, then, do we arrive at true beliefs?  It is to Nash’s great credit that he draws upon the Reformed Epistemology school’s use of Thomas Reid.  He quotes Wolterstorff on Reid: “At the very foundation of Reid’s approach is his claim that at any point in our lives we have a variety of dispositions, inclinations, propensities, to believe things–belief dispositions we may call them. What accounts for our beliefs, in the vast majority of cases anyway, is the triggering of one and another such disposition.”

On open theism: “When I think about this view of God, I often find myself in a situation wanting to pray for this God.  I would probably do that, except under the circumstances, I’m not sure who I should pray to.”

Ethics and Emotivism

Problems with emotivism:

1. Every ethical judgment is correct, for how can my feelings be wrong?
2. All moral actions are good and bad at the same time
3. No one actually disagrees over moral issues
4. It implies a contradiction: if someone says, “I like to get drunk, but I know it is wrong,” he actually means “I like to get drunk, but I don’t like to get drunk.”

Conclusion

This is probably my favorite text on worldview. It is somewhat technical in parts, so it might not be the first text to start with.

Van Til and the Foundation of Christian Ethics (Hatch)

Hatch, Scott J. Van Til and the Foundation of Christian Ethics: A God-Centered Approach to Moral Philosophy. Libertyville, IL: Reformed Forum, 2023.

In the investment world, there is a danger in over investing in stocks that appear good but do not deliver all that is hoped.  The same is true in theology.  There are good (intellectual) investments in Van Til’s theology.  Unfortunately, his students over invested in his epistemology and apologetic method while leaving his ethics largely untouched.  This is a shame, as his ethics promise a number of key insights to the Christian life.

Scott Hatch of Reformed Forum has given probably the best (and maybe the first; I am not sure) systematic treatment of Van Til’s ethics.  I do not think there is anything like it in print. He surveys the failure of modern ethics, the nature of the summum bonum, Van Til’s theonomic and Klinean followers, and the structure of the will in Christian discipleship.  He has several appendices that include the full text of Van Til’s 1930 syllabus.

The Enlightenment Project had to fail because it lacked a foundation for justification. It degenerated into emotivism. Kierkegaard could not give a reason for actions other than “because.” Hume realized morality was just desires.

By contrast, summing up the problem, Hatch notes: “To call something good is to make an evaluative judgment, but an evaluative judgment implies a kind of standard or criterion by which an evaluation can be made” (Hatch 17).

Van Til and Vos

Hatch comes closer than any other recent author in showing the connection that Geerhardus Vos had on Van Til.  We know Van Til said Vos was his favorite teacher, but seeing “Vosian” elements in Van Til’s work is a tougher challenge.  I maintain it is difficult because we look for Vosian elements in the wrong place.  You will not find them, not in any great detail, in his apologetics works.  You will, however, find them in his ethics (28). The biblical-theological method allowed Van Til to see a unity between Old Testament and New Testament ethics.

In Search of An Ethical Absolute

Van Til took a “worldview approach” to Christian ethics, specifically Reformed Christian ethics. By “worldview” neither Hatch nor Van Til mean giving the stock Christian answers to pre-selected questions.  Rather, “worldview” means “Reformed worldview,” a view of life derivative of the revelation of the self-contained God. A specifically Reformed ethic will contain “the absolute self-sufficient personal God; the self-revelation of God in nature and history; the reality of sin; and the revelation of God objectively in Christ and Scripture and subjectively through regeneration and sanctification” (31).

Metaphysics and Biblicism

This might not have been Hatch’s point, but Van Til eschews any type of biblicism that rejects the need for metaphysics.  Hatch notes that Van Til saw “how modernist and liberal thought veers toward moralism but lacks any real metaphysical or epistemological foundation” (33). Indeed, in Defense of the Faith (2008) he says “metaphysics is logically foundational for both epistemology and ethics” (quoted in Hatch 46).

Idealism and Pragmatism

Van Til’s comments on idealism are somewhat dated.  You will find few idealists today. Pragmatism, on the other hand, will always be relevant.  Fortunately, apart from any Christian ethic it is easily dispensed with: “if the absolute is constantly evolving, then there is no fixed reference point for moral values’ ‘ (53).

Personality and the Will

In 2010, Richard Muller critiqued Jonathan Edwards’ view of the will as departing from the historic Reformed teaching, causing a firestorm among some of Edwards’ followers. I tend to think Muller was right, but neither side was altogether convincing.  In other words, pace Edwards I actually believe I make free decisions.  Pace Muller, when I act I seem to act in a unity as a whole person.  Faculty psychology might be true (I think it is), but few people are conscious of it when they act.

It is a shame that neither side in the debate used Van Til’s insights.  Following Augustine, he notes “man is free, but he does not have the freedom of contrary choice, and is nonetheless responsible for his actions” (99). Modern advertising seems to confirm Van Til’s point: “the expanding industry of advertising and communications has highlighted psychologically just how subtly and subconsciously people can be influenced” (102). In other words, a judicious ethics has a whole approach to the whole man.

Toward a Reformed Christian Ethic

As man gets progressively sanctified, he gets progressively “freer” (104).  How is this possible?  Van Til gives an eloquent format from his syllabus: man must become “increasingly spontaneous in willing the will of God,” “increasingly fixed in strengthening the backbone of this will,” and “increasingly [growing] in momentum to meet this increasing responsibility” (CVT, CTE 44-46). This is made possible by its working out in the larger narrative of post-redemptive history. In other words, he must strive for the true summum bonum, the highest good. The summum bonum is the kingdom of God.

Kline, Bahnsen, and Frame

Both Meredith Kline and Greg Bahnsen saw Van Til as formative for their theology, yet Kline and Bahnsen came to radically different conclusions about ethics.  Who, then, was the most faithful student of Van Til?  There is a better way to rephrase this question and answer it: Van Til was a faithful student of Geerhardus Vos when it comes to the nature of the ethical life.

Greg Bahnsen’s theonomy is widely-known, so we will only touch on the highlights for this discussion.  Theonomy proper depends on two points: 1) a unique exegesis of Matthew 5:17ff and 2) the claim that the Old Testament penal codes are binding today unless otherwise rescinded.  It should be obvious by now that Van Til taught no such thing in his ethics.  Neither can it be inferred he taught this in his ethics. I think Bahnsen suspected this (and I think Gary North knew it).  Bahnsen mentions Van Til’s ethics only once in his 500 page work on theonomy, and there it is only Van Til’s claim that there is either theonomy or autonomy, but it is clear that Van Til meant it in a general sense.  Therefore, we can safely conclude, and Hatch does, that Bahnsen’s ethics is not faithful to Van Til’s.

Does that mean Kline is the true Van Tillian on ethics?  It is not so clear there, either. Kline maintained, or at least he pointed out, a “seeming inconsistency between the Decalogue and certain divine commands,” which he called “intrusion” (137). On one level, this seems like common sense.  The conquest of Canaan is an intrusion of the End Times Judgment into history, yet this intrusion is not normative.  What is not clear, though, is what counts as intrusion and what counts as application. The more we see typological anticipations in the Old Testament, the less useful is the Old Testament for ethics. I think Kline is probably closer to Van Til in terms of biblical narrative than Bahnsen is, but I do not believe he would have accepted Kline’s intrusion ethics.

Criticisms

As with many books about or by Van Til, “reason” is always “autonomous reason” if used by the other guy (21-22). Moreover, Hatch refers to Oliphint’s book on Thomas Aquinas, noting, however, that Oliphint’s analysis has met with severe criticism (22 n24).  He does not think the criticisms damage the main point.  I suspect they do.

Speaking of Thomas Aquinas, Hatch only mentions Aquinas’s actual writings once, and in a footnote, and even then it is a reference to James Dolezal’s God Without Parts, quoting Summa Contra Gentiles. This is a recurring theme with Van Tillian literature.  We need to see more interaction with actual passages from Thomas Aquinas. We are often told “Thomas’s view reduces to x” or “His Aristotelianism is clear here,” but we never see how that is the case.

I suppose some thinkers, notably Kant and Hume, were guilty of “autonomous reason,” but I have read enough works by presuppositionalists to suspect that the adjective “autonomous” is doing the heavy lifting normally required by sustained analysis of primary sources.  That analysis we do not always see.

Conclusion

These criticisms should be noted, but they do not take away the value of the book.  The book is literally in a class by itself.  Van Tillians, and even presuppositionalists from other schools, should pay more attention to Van Til’s writings on ethics. They generally do not have the difficulties found in some of his other works, save on one possible point: Van Til’s syllabus, in a way not dissimilar to Oliver O’Donovan’s works, does not always deal with practical problems in ethics.  That is not a problem.  Van Til, as the title of this work suggests, deals with “the foundation of Christian ethics.”

‘This review copy was provided by the publisher in exchange for a fair and honest review.’

Utilitarianism (John Stuart Mill)

Mill, John Stuart.  Utilitarianism.

Despite all of the logical problems in Mill’s proposal, he is mostly astute enough to see them.  He is too good a thinker to allow his position to reduce to a crude Epicureanism. Moreover, even if we reject Mill’s arguments, we must admit at least some force to his claims.  If more people are made happy by an action, that is better than if only one person were happy.  Unfortunately, the ethical options are never that neat.

How do we choose what is a pleasure? Both men and pigs seek pleasure.  By seeking pleasure, how does man distinguish himself from swine? Mill argues he does so by his inherent dignity, allowing him to seek the more noble pleasures.  I actually agree in part, but I do not understand how Mill can make this claim, given his earlier criticisms of those philosophies that base themselves on first principles.  Even more problematic, it is not clear how the utilitarian calculus can make a distinction between what is more noble and what is less.  It is one thing to say we ought to do the greatest good for the greatest number.  It is less clear on how one can know whether a thing is a particular good.

The above discussion places Mill squarely within the classical reflections on happiness. Men desire happiness and they seek, more or less, to fulfill that desire. Aristotle and Aquinas said as much. Where Mill departs is in his naturalistic conception of happiness.  He argues that happiness cannot be intuitive.

The State of the Question

Mill, like Jeremy Bentham, said we should maximize the good for the greatest number of people. Such a pursuit, moreover, is a disinterested one on my part.  As I seek the greatest good, I do so regardless of whether it benefits me or not. We must note, indeed even appreciate, the social aspect of Mill’s ethics.  This is not entirely foreign from Aristotelian discussions of justice.  For example, some virtues I can practice as an individual, but to be a just man I have to have someone else.

Problems

The only being who could possibly have the knowledge to be a Utilitarian is God himself, and he is not one. As Bertrand Russell noted elsewhere, the same problem applies to all consequentialist schools.  Many times I cannot know if an action is really good until we see the consequences of it.  But sometimes I cannot even know if the consequences are good until I see the consequences of the consequences!

A more practical objection says that no one can use the utilitarian principle in the heat of a moral crisis. If one has to make an ethical decision without much time to deliberate, it does no good to engage in a dispassionate calculation of gains and losses. Not only do most people not have the time for that, most do not even have the intelligence.  Mill responds that people have the entire moral history of the human race available to him.  Moreover, most Christians do not have time to read the entire bible before each choice they make.  Still, most people do not have the time and intelligence to evaluate the history of the human race before each act.  And as to Christians, absolute biblical principles are kept to a manageable number (usually ten), so the comparison fails at this point.

Perhaps the worst, albeit probably only a theoretical, problem is that on a Utilitarian gloss there is no reason not to persecute minority groups.  If 50% + 1 agrees to take the property of the wealthy, then that would be the greatest good for the greatest number.  Actually, this is not a theoretical problem; it is one of the practical results of democracy.

Conclusion

Mill’s book, though flawed in numerous respects, deserves careful reading.  The more educated secularist is probably familiar with, and defaults to, Mill’s argument. And his argument is easy to follow.  Mill was an excellent writer and was deeply familiar with the classical tradition.

Discourse of Conscience (William Perkins)

Perkins, William.  The Works of William Perkins vol. 8 . Ed. J. Stephen Yuille. Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage Books, 2019.

Were the Puritans introspective men who worried about right and wrong and salvation?  Such is a common caricature.  In terms of theology, one might say that the Puritans looked inward instead of to Christ.  Therefore, it might surprise some (and it had earlier surprised me) to find that William Perkins, the father of English Puritanism, was not introspective in such a way. In fact, rather surprisingly, this volume is a “page-turner.”  Perkins begins with the nature and structure of man’s conscience. From that foundation, he engages in what earlier writers called “casuistry.” This volume contains five separate works, three of which deal with conscience in one form or another. The other two are dialogues on assurance.

Conscience does not simply deal with man and God, or man and himself.  As Perkins makes clear, there is a three-fold working of conscience in our lives: man and himself, man and God, and man and other men. In other words, Perkins gives the reader a mini-systematic theology, which was a delightful surprise.

I am dividing volume eight into a number of reviews. Moreover, these posts will not be reviews in the strict sense, as I will not be giving full analyses of them. Rather, I am stating Perkins’ own views. A full analysis will come later.

A Discourse of Conscience

Perkins defines conscience as “a part of the understanding in all reasonable creatures, determining their particular actions either with them or against them” (6). In good Ramist fashion, he distinguishes the soul as understanding and will. Understanding can view the truth or the good action. Will does the actual choosing or refusing. Although Perkins places conscience in the understanding, he is clear that it is not a spectator, but “a natural power, faculty, or created quality, from whence knowledge and judgment proceed.”

Conscience cannot be identified purely with the mind.  As he notes, a mind thinks a thought.  “Conscience goes beyond the mind, and knows what the mind thinks” (10). With conscience, we also speak of the act of judgment. A judgment determines whether a thing is “well done or ill done” (12).

Continuing his Ramist method, Perkins further explains judgment. A judgment is preceded by a cause.  This cause “binds” the conscience. As Perkins notes, “The binder is that thing whatsoever which has power and authority over conscience to order it” (13).  The binder is either “proper or improper.” The proper is what has absolute authority, which, of course, is the Word of God.  In good Protestant fashion, Perkins then divides the Word of God into “law or gospel” (14). 

The law is the moral law “contained in the Decalogue or Ten Commandments, and it is the very law of nature written in all men’s hearts” (14). Perkins then makes a very shrewd and unexpected move.  What happens when two commandments cannot be obeyed at the same time? (The standard “Nazis at the door” scenario.).  Perkins gives what ethicists call “a graded absolutist response.”  In other words, the lesser commandment (e.g., thou shalt not lie) gives way to the greater commandment (thou shalt not murder).

In terms of the Mosaic law, Perkins identifies the “civil law” with the Jewish commonwealth.  As the latter expired, so did the former (16). Judicial laws can be divided in two: particular and common equity.  What is common equity?  Perkins, unlike most on either side in the theonomy debate, actually defines it.  A law of common equity has two necessary conditions: if wise men who are not among the Jews acknowledge it, and/or natural reason and conscience judge it to be just (16).

Having explained the “mechanics” of conscience, Perkins explores to what degree the magistrate can bind the conscience, particularly in areas of morality. For example, if a law can be known by either nature or grace, “it binds by virtue of known conclusions in the mind” (21). 

In terms of weaker binding, the magistrate can determine and maintain outward order and peace in the commonwealth (27). This is what older writers meant by “things indifferent.” A human law can bind the conscience only on “things good,” which Perkins notes are “commanded by God” (39). A human law can legitimately constrain us on things indifferent, provided it furthers the good of the commonwealth.

Oaths

Oaths are either assertory or promissory (43). An oath binds “when it is made of things certain and possible” (44). Perkins walks the reader through a number of scenarios in which oaths are binding:

• Oaths of infidels. Even though they do not swear by the true God, it is a civil bond and reflects the law of nature (44).
• Oaths made under guile: if it is of a thing lawful, it binds (45).
• Oaths made by fear or compulsion: if it does not hurt the good of the commonwealth (e.g., in the case where a thief swears you to silence), then it probably binds (45).
• Oaths made against the law of nature cannot bind, such as papists making oaths to chastity (46).

On Violating Conscience

It is obvious that violating God’s law is sin. But what if it concerns a “gray area” but my conscience says it is wrong, is that a sin?  Perkins answers yes. If I doubt whether an act is right, and I do it, it is a sin (Rom. 14:23).

Doing something with an erroneous conscience is sin.  If someone does not believe fornication is wrong, and he does it, then it is a sin (Perkins 54). On the other hand, if an act is neutral, yet I think it is wrong, such as the Anabaptist taking an oath, then the sin is in the doer, even though the act itself is good.

On Recreation and the like

What we call “recreation” falls under the category “things indifferent.” If God gave man something unnecessary for his joy, such as wine, then there is no reason, reasoning by analogy, not to joy in lawful recreation.  For recreation to be lawful, it must be of things that are not sinful, yet used in moderation (58-59). 

Salvation and Assurance

Perkins’ order and method is not always clear.  He moves from the topic of dancing to that of assurance (61).  Before one can answer questions of “infallible assurance,” he must be clear on terms like “certainty.”  Some often confuse “certainty of faith” with “certainty of my experience.” The latter is good, but it can never hold the former hostage. I can have certainty of my salvation because the Spirit makes me cry, ‘Abba.’  He makes me cry and declare, not merely “feel.”

Moreover, if faith is a substance of things, then it cannot be that “general faith” of which Roman Catholics speak (65).

My Duties

Preparationism

If the early Puritans believed in “preparationism,” it was never in the perhaps caricatured sense of later generations. Perkins identifies four characteristics of preparationism: knowledge of the law, knowledge of the judicial sentence of the law, serious estimation of the conscience by the law, and sorrow in respect for the punishment of sin (86-87).

The Art of Achievement (Tom Morris)

Morris, Tom V. The Art of Achievement.

Seven Cs: Conception, Confidence, Concentration, Consistency, Commitment, Character, and Capacious Enjoyment

We are all artists. Art is that which transforms what something is. Before you begin on this journey of the Seven Cs, you must first ask, “What do you want?” and then “Is it right for you?” This is partly what the ancients meant by “Know thyself.” This keeps us from chasing the wrong things.

Tom Morris takes us through the fun process of accurate goal-setting.

Thesis: true success involves discovering, developing, and deploying your talents.

Goal setting is a paradox. It frees us by removing distractions. As we pursue the goal, other things on the path take on clearer focus.

The Art of Conception

A “telos” is a target we can shoot at. This is a clear conception of what we want. In order to have clear goals, we need to set them with our self-knowledge in mind. As Morris notes, “Goal setting is an exercise in self-knowledge.”

When we reach a “critical mass” of self-knowledge, we can begin healthy goal-setting. When we pursue these goals, we find more self-knowledge.

Pithy Sayings

“Know your opportunity” (Pittacus, 600 B.C.)
“The only point of ‘freedom from’ is to provide ‘freedom to’” (Morris).
“For it is feeling and force of imagination that makes us eloquent” (Quintillian).
Thales: “What is difficult? To know yourself.” “What is easy? To give other people advice.”
“Stupidity is without anxiety” (Goethe).
“The arrogant person says ‘Look at me!’ The enthusiastic person says, ‘Look at this!’” (Morris)

Desires aren’t the same as fantasies. A fantasy is fleeting. As Morris notes, “A desire is connected to volition, our capacity for choice.” While desire involves the will, it is not a goal. A goal is a commitment of the will. A goal engages the whole person, not just the intellect. Goal setting should also include cultivating supporting desires that will help you reach that goal.

Paradox: Bigger goals mean we will face more difficulties, but with bigger goals it is easier to engage the whole imagination.

Conceiving goals always involves our purpose. If we can’t state what our purpose is, we can’t make a clear goal. The goal must answer the question, “Why am I doing this?” Or rather, you can’t make a clear goal if you can’t answer that question. Specific goals also need a standard of measurement.

There is a difference between “local maximum” and “global maximum.” The former is when you reach your goals, but you still have room for improvement. Too many companies stay at local maximum.

Part 2: The Art of Confidence

If courage is the mean between cowardice and brashness, then confidence is the mean between anxiety and arrogance.

Logic of confidence: power and skill. Just because you have the skill for x doesn’t mean you are skillful at x. Also included in the logic of confidence is capability, or “moral attributes.” If you are facing any problem dealing with your own confidence, consider this checklist:

* Do I have the power to get the job done?
* Do I have the skill necessary to the task?
* Do I have the opportunity to make this happen?
* Do I have the practical knowledge to put this together?
* Do I feel morally right about this?
* Do I have the heart for this project?

A good leader develops the skill for initiating necessary change. Start by making little decisions. This allows your confidence to grow. He gives another checklist for making yourself mentally able to initiate positive change (and this has been later confirmed by neuroscience).

*Visualization
* Articulation (practice speaking your goal and your plan of attack).
* Directed action. Move forward.

The Art of Concentration

The simple answer: hard work. Morris writes: “Hard work, if it is to be productive, must involve a perceptive and focused concentration on exactly what it will take for us to make progress toward our goals.” This puts balance to our big dreams:

“Big Picture Vision” ———————- Bifocal Thinking ———————————Detail Focus

The extremes are at the end. We need to focus along a spectrum of our goals. In Morris’s words, we are “large-scale strategic thinkers” and “small-scale tacticians.”

Attacking Your Goals

1 Problem. Where are we?
2 Ideal. Where do we want to be?
3 How to get there. How can we get there?

It is always good to anticipate difficulties when you plan your goal. Imagining how you will overcome them will also contribute to the goal setting.

Action epistemology: knowledge often comes from action.
Metaphysical luck: luck never produces success. It can only produce opportunities for success.

Intro to Philosophy Source List

Earlier I had done a list on which basic philosophy texts to read. Here I should step back and look at the best secondary literature on the topic. On one hand, some philosophers like Plato need no interpreters. His writing is too good. Others, like Hegel and Kant, demand interpreters. The writing is not so good. Even worse, men like Locke and Hume are not always using terms the way you think they are.

Learning the Language

101 Key Terms in Philosophy and their use for Theology. Eds. Clark and Smith. Covers theological prolegomena, some analytic philosophy, and some hippie continental nonsense.

Using the Tools

Baggini, Julian. The Philosopher’s Toolkit. Excellent job explaining the methodology in philosophy. Written from a secular standpoint.

History of Philosophy

Frame, John. History of Western Philosophy. Okay. Frame’s strength is in linguistic analysis. Good sections on Kant and Hegel. Misreads other thinkers, though.

Russell, Bertrand. A History of Western Philosophy. Once you get over how impressed Russell is with himself, this is a handy tool. Very well-written.

Scruton, Roger. A Short History of Modern Philosophy. A sheer joy to read. Writing style surpasses Russell’s.

Tarnas, Richard. Passion of the Western Mind.

Philosophy of Religion

Thiselton, Anthony. Approaching Philosophy of Religion. Superb writing. Leans analytical with discussions on Wittgenstein.

Rowe, William. Philosophy of Religion. Rowe is an atheist but a competent philosopher. This isn’t his best work, though.

Epistemology

Meek, Esther Lightcap. A Little Manual for Knowing. Wonderful account of how we know. Almost has a healing effect on the mind.

Wood, W. Jay. Epistemology. Echoes some of Plantinga’s moves.

Ethics

Holmes, Arthur. Ethics. Great discussion of utilitarianism.

Geisler, Norman. Ethics: Issues and Options. Probably the best modern systematic treatment of ethics. Presents his “graded absolutism.”

Metaphysics

Hasker, William. Metaphysics. In the same series as Wood and Holmes. Hasker is an open theist, but even then he presents a very weak defense of free will.

Chisolm, Roderick. On Metaphysics. Difficult at times but a number of important discussions.

Engaging the World

Moreland, J. P. Love Your God with All Your Mind. Probably the most important philosophy text I have ever read.

Moreland, J. P. Kingdom Triangle. Similar effect as the above one. Updates JP’s project to include virtue ethics and the Spirit’s power.

Making Sense of it All: Pascal and the Meaning of Life

Morris, Thomas V. Making Sense of it All: Pascal and the Meaning of Life. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1992.

As with all of Professor Morris’s books, this one could not be boring even if it tried. Tom Morris gives a lucid account of Pascal’s worldview without its being another exposition of the Pensees.

Pascal is not trying to make an argument for God’s existence. His concern is much deeper. You cannot ignore ultimate concerns. You cannot be indifferent about an object of love. Although this will be a particular focus of his famous “Wager,” it accurately reflects his general outlook. His arguments report “on a connection that has motivational impact” (Morris 24). The form of our behaviors function in a certain context.

Diversion and the “Empty Self”

Pascal and Morris address the problem that later psychologists would call “the empty self.” People have a vacuum in their lives and they fill it with diversions. It is only when crises arise that people deal with deep issues, but, as Morris cogently observes, “that’s not usually when we have the clearest heads for figuring things out” (34).

To combat the empty self, Morris, following Pascal, notes three realms: physical, intellectual, and spiritual. “A full, complete human life will encompass, or partake of, all three realms” (37).

The Meaning of Life

After exploring some reasons why people commit suicide, Morris explains how one can find the meaning of life. He begins with what he calls “The Endowment Thesis,” “Something has meaning if and only if it is endowed with meaning or significance by a purposive agent or group of such agents” (56). In other words, “Meaning is never intrinsic; it is always derivative” (57).

Following the Endowment Thesis is the “Control Thesis:” “We can endow with meaning only those things over which we have legitimate control” (59).

Wagering on a Hidden God

The problem with believing in God is not the existence of evil but the fact that God seems so hidden. Why does not God simply give me more proof or evidence? Probably because he knows what I would do with it. Morris writes: “In human development, the paramount importance attaches not just to what we know but to what we become and do. Perfect clarity, the free gift of unambiguous knowledge in matters of religion, might for many people be dangerous” (98).

Lacking such knowledge, we can now understand Pascal’s famous wager. This is not an argument for God’s existence but a strategy for living. A good wager will account for “expected value” (112ff).

(EV): (Probability x Payoff) – Cost = Expected Value.

Morris gives the following example. Gold (a horse) has a ⅔ probability of winning with a payoff of $300. Placing a bet costs sixty dollars. Silver, another horse, by contrast, “pays nine hundred dollars, and to bet on this horse costs only $20” (112-113). Even with only a ⅓ probability of winning, Silver is clearly the best bet.

The key strategy is not how much money I get at the end, but how can I quantify “the overall value of each bet.”

Applying this to the religious realm, we can look at the costs of admission into the best. As Morris points out, the cost of admission is not heaven or hell, but what we are giving up in this life. The Christian gives up, among other things, a life of selfishness and debauchery. The atheist gives up having any kind of real hope. Strangely enough, if the atheist is right, he cannot know that he is right (119). At best, the atheist can only have a finite number of benefits against the potential of infinite loss.

It might be objected that such a wager does not actually create belief in God. Of course it does not. That misses the point. One cannot simply manufacture beliefs. Rather, such a wager structures our actions, which in turn may condition beliefs. Pascal seeks “to cultivate those capacities on the part of people who, because of the great values involved, are gambling their lives, hoping for success (124).

How does such a wager condition our beliefs. Morris suggests the following: action creates emotion, which in turn either blinds us or opens our eyes to aspects of our objective environments. They “color patterns of perception that either reveal or hide from us the ultimate realities” (125). In other words,
Action → Emotion → Perception → Objective situation

Conclusion

I will admit that Pascal is not my favorite philosopher, and I certainly do not consider him a Christian apologist. He was a fairly good psychologist, though. Professor Morris, here and elsewhere, does a fine job elucidating these key realities of the human condition.

Epictetus (Discourses)

This is a manual for Business Ethics 101. The following metaphor is not original to me, but imagine your life as placed on a wheel with spokes.  If you focus your life in the center, the hub, then when the wheel turns, as it must, you will be moved, to be sure, but you won’t be thrown over the place.

Epictetus exhorts the reader to develop a strong inner life.  This goes beyond merely getting your priorities right.  It means being proactive and never reactive.  It even includes a calculus for business decisions.  Know your worth. 

Epictetus does not paint a rosy picture for the reader.  Having been a slave in a cruel world, he knows how the world can be.  He does not think it will ever get any better.  If Stoicism has sometimes been accused of being resigned to despair, that criticism might have some justification with Epictetus.

He does give us the basics of a Stoic worldview. There is the standard Stoic line on rationality.  Man is midway between beasts and God.  From the former he has a body, the latter a mind.

Purpose

Man’s good is a type of moral purpose, or “a disposition of the will with respect to appearances” (1.8).

On the Gods

When Epictetus uses the term “God,” he can mean the gods, Jupiter, and/or a guardian spirit within us. He believes our souls are “parts and portions of God.”  We also have a guardian genius with us.

As a good Stoic, Epictetus assumes some form of pantheism, albeit not an extreme kind.  All things are united as one (I:14).  He does not mean some form of Eastern pantheism.  His point, so it seems, is to find a reciprocal relationship between heaven and earth.  In fact, “our bodies are intimately linked with the earth’s rhythms.”  We do not have to accept his mild pantheism, but that statement is not wrong.

Epistemology

“Impressions” is the key word in Epictetus’s epistemology. It is not always clear what an impression is. Notwithstanding that, they come to us in four ways: “things are and appear to be; or they are not, and do not appear to be, or they are, but do not appear to be; or they are not, and yet appear to be” (I.27.1).

 The mind forms “ideas that correspond with the impressions” (I.14.8). That seems accurate enough, but Epictetus takes it a step further with his definition of reason: a collection of individual impressions (I.20.5). That does not seem right.

Education

The goal of education is to bring our will in alignment with God’s reality and governance (I.12.15). As long as we understand that Epictetus does not mean the same thing by “God” as one normally does, it is a true enough statement. 

One strength in his approach is that there is not a sharp line between epistemology, education, and ethics.  Epistemology and education dovetail with his use of the term “impressions.”  We all have preconceptions. Our reason makes use of “impressions.”  Getting an education, therefore, is “learning to apply natural preconceptions to particular cases as nature prescribes, and distinguishing what is in our power from what is not” (I.22.9). That last clause connects education with ethics.  The wise man understands what he can and cannot control.

Ethics

The goal of virtue is “a life that flows smoothly” (12).  Even though he does not use the term, he means that we should reach a state of apatheia. We can only do this by having “correct judgments about externals,” as externals are the only things outside of our control (I.29.24).

Analysis

If one wants to read a primary source on Stoicism, this is as good as any.  Epictetus, perhaps in line with his own philosophy of limitations, never gets to the substance of the issue.  These are more conversations than logical analyses, and they should be judged as such.  It even seems that Epictetus commits a logical fallacy.  He writes: “God is helpful. Whatever is good is also helpful.  It is reasonable to suppose, then, that the divine nature and the nature of the good correspond” (II.8.1).  The conclusion is certainly true, but Epictetus committed the fallacy of the undistributed middle premise. We can illustrate it in a Venn Diagram.

Conclusion

Epictetus lacks the nobility of Marcus Aurelius and the poetic grandeur of Lucretius. In some ways, however, he is more accessible than both.

The Stoic Art of Living (Morris)

Morris, Tom.  The Stoic Art of Living: Inner Resilience and Outer Results. Open Court: Chicago, 2004.

Check out his website
https://www.tomvmorris.com/

Key idea: Our life goals must be rooted in self-knowledge, “guided by a sense of what is good, and should take form within an ennobling big picture” (Morris 5).

Seneca

The mind should be exercised continually (10).

The proper application of any insight depends on perspective (15).

Seneca details the importance of goal-setting.  “Begin with the end in view.”  Not just any goals, but goals that are proper to you.  The challenge is to find out how we can know the right goals.  That’s where proper philosophy comes in.  We have to go beyond what we want to “what we should want” (19).  Seneca’s task was to link proper goal setting with pursuing the Good. We know that our desires aren’t always good ones; a proper understanding of the Good can try to offset erroneous desires.

Our larger goals will most likely be shaped, whether for good or for ill, by how our soul has developed at that point. Our smaller goals must fit within that larger structure.

Key idea: adversity is necessary for “soul-making.”

Goals and Sequences

Morris echoes, or perhaps anticipates, themes from his other works: “We need a clear conception of what is important” (36-37).

Key idea: “Inconsistency often shows that at some level we really don’t know what we want” (39).  Consistency is truth.  When you are inconsistent, you are not being true to yourself.  One way to guide us is reason.  But Seneca has a “thick,” not thin concept of reason: “It is the whole ability we have to grasp, through intuition, interpretation, and inference, what the truth is about anything” (42).

While many probably admire the Stoic’s ability to not let things get to them, few can go with them on negating all emotion.  Is that what the Stoics really teach?  Probably.  Maybe.  The key point, as Morris notes, is that “any extreme of emotion can distort our perspective if it gets out of control” (48).

Ethics

The most famous modern ethical dilemma is the trolley dilemma or perhaps the Nazis at the door.  Such discussions are important but largely irrelevant to modern life.  Following Seneca, Morris notes, “In modern times we are encouraged to suspect that ethical dilemmas will stalk us at every turn, making it nearly impossible to have agreed upon, universally applicable standards” (57). In reality, you won’t be in those situations.

While we cannot go with the cosmic pantheism of the Stoics, they are correct that we stand in “reciprocally dependent relations with each other.”

Perspective

“It is not external forces in our lives, but our own beliefs about those forces that pressure us and bring on us all the negative experience” (76).  The background for this comment is that we shouldn’t look to the external world for our happiness. Morris takes the Stoic emphasis on the internal and draws a shocking (yet common-sense) conclusion: by focusing “our thoughts, plans, attitudes and energies…close to home, to what we can control, to the small sphere of real personal competence that we do command,” we are actually able to achieve positive change and balance (81). 

In other words, identify your range of control.  Your range of control is what is truly in your power: assent, aspiration, and action (86). This means developing our core within ourselves, which for the Stoics meant cultivating virtue and living according to reason. This means cultivating the will, “the seat of virtue or vice” (99).

Good practical advice

“It is only the relaxed and rested mind that can be intuitive and creative to its highest potential” (60-61).

Reason isn’t everything.  “While we should govern imagination by reason, it is only the power of the imagination that is able to tame emotion” (93).

Like all of Morris’s books, this book makes the ethical life exciting.  As Christians we don’t always have to agree with the Stoics (and Morris offers his own criticisms at the end).  Nonetheless, the early Christians in the New Testament dealt with the Stoics and Epicureans, not the Platonists (who are no doubt important in their own way).