Financial Vipers of Venice

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The first part of this review covers previous material.  The second part is the rest of Farrell’s book. This is sort of a sequel to Babylon’s Banksters. It’s mostly excellent, though he does get into his anti-Yahweh speculation at times. I don’t think that is necessary to his thesis and it somewhat detracts from the book. On the other hand, his comments on the nature of mind, soul, and the Topological Metaphor are outstanding.

His thesis starts out that Giordano Bruno discovered the Topological Metaphor, which functioned as an information-creating medium. Applied to finance, this meant an open-ended system which had no need of debt or usury, and so he was killed. I actually think he was killed because he was a heretic, but I think the medium is basically correct.

1 = 3

Imagine an undifferentiated “No-Thing.” This isn’t “nothing” in the sense of non-existence. It’s rather like an empty hyper-set. Designate it with Φ. Imagine an empty rectangle. Now, we cleave this space. So now we have two spaces, “all that inside the circle, and all outside it” (Farrell 126). All of the space outside the circle will be the interior of space 1, designated as a topological “o” superscript above the Φ.

(1) Φ⁰

The space inside the circle is another interior, (2) Φ⁰.

And the common surface between the two, designated with an alpha

ɑΦ₁₂

Now let’s look at what just happened. Remember we still have our empty hyperset (Φ). We now have three derivatives: the space outside the circle, the space inside the circle, and the common surface between the two. Thus,

Φ = (1) Φ⁰, (2) Φ⁰, and ɑΦ₁₂

Therefore, 1 = 3. I’m going to take this model in a radically different direction than does Farrell. He thinks this model represents an earlier way of thinking about the cosmos that predated Yahwist traditions. I’m skeptical of that claim, as some of Farrell’s positions have come under attack.

But the model itself is quite powerful, and it explains a way of looking at some difficult sayings by St Maximus the Confessor.

But back to Farrell’s argument. Because the above model is written in quasi-mathematical terms, and because it couldn’t exist without a conscious observer (or Mind), this means we have an information-creating system. This is a system that doesn’t reduce to a closed cosmos (and thus Aristotle is false).

Farrell says the hermetic occultist Giordano Bruno was advocating something like that. Maybe. The problem is that Bruno couched all of it in what we call New Age terminology, and that’s partly why he got burned at the stake. There might have been another reason why he got burned: he advocated a way of approaching the world, and particularly finance, that attacked the Aristotelian and (ironically) usurious system of the Venetians. Bruno thought he could tap into the primordial medium.

Farrell begins his alternative history of Venice. Earlier Roman authors like Juvenal suggested that there was a strong Babylonian influx in the Roman genetic makeup. Farrell suggests this Babylonian streak later went to Venice.

His reconstruction of Venetian history is interesting and probably accurate. Relevant to our purposes is the relation of “money” to the Medium. Farrell says that concepts like “debt” and “sacrifice” were illegitimate applications of the Medium/Metaphor (124).

Some societies were able to get around the debt-money concept by issuing Jubilees and promissory notes backed, not by bullion, but by labor and production (132).

Coinage introduced something new: it gave “order and rationality to multiplicity” (136). Bullion, especially when stamped, represents the unchanging, underlying substrate. It makes the users equal, and hence derivations of the metaphor. Person = some aspect of nature (137). Since this metaphor can differentiate without limit, there is no notion of debt (at least at this time).

The Fiction of the Corporate Person

The doctrine of original sin is related to the notion of infinite debt (146).

Eph ho pantes hemarton

KJV: for that all sinned

What is the antecedent of ho? Is it ho anthropos or ho thanatos? If we take the former, then we have a grammatical problem: reflexive pronouns refer to the nearest antecedent, not the farthest:

“Wherefore, as by one man sin entered the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men, because of the one man all sinned.”

The more literal translation:

“Wherefore as by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men, because of death all have sinned.”

Death is passed to all men, not moral culpability (148). The Western doctrine of inherited guilt is based upon the doctrine of Corporate Personhood.

Latin Vulgate: en quo omnes peccaverunt.

Notes on Person and Nature:

I am a person. I have a soul. Therefore, we cannot reduce the person to the soul’s natural functions (reason, will, etc). Yet on the Vulgate’s translation, we have the following (151ff):

1. The Person of Adam (one man) sins.
2. Sin is a personal use of the natural operation of the will, common to all humanity.
3. The moral culpability of Adam’s willing passes to all humanity.
4. Therefore, the person is now connected both with the natural operation of the will and the common nature on the basis of one. One person (Adam) is now a group of people (humanity).

There is a superficial similarity to the Venetian supercompanies (153).

Is There an English Connection?

Maybe. Venetian bankers made a number of loans to Edward III (166ff). The rest of the book surveys numerous, often brilliant, strategies by Venetian clans concerning bullion. The connection is stronger than that. After the War of the Cambrai, Venice knew its days were numbered. Geographically, it was in a backwater and had no access to the newly-discovered New World (or India). Farrell traces the intermarrying into the Guelphs, who would later become the Hanoverian monarchs.

But Venice didn’t go straight to England. It stopped first in Amsterdam.

While shorter than his other books, this is somewhat slow-going. It is heavier on the history aspect His thesis seems relatively sound, and his musings on metaphysics and theology are top-notch.

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Vipers of Venice: The Topological Metaphor

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This is sort of a sequel to Babylon’s Banksters.  It’s mostly excellent, though he does get into his anti-Yahweh speculation at times.  I don’t think that is necessary to his thesis and it somewhat detracts from the book. On the other hand, his comments on the nature of mind, soul, and the Topological Metaphor are outstanding.

1 = 3

Imagine an undifferentiated “No-Thing.”  This isn’t “nothing” in the sense of non-existence.  It’s rather like an empty hyper-set. Designate it with Φ.   Imagine an empty rectangle:

Image result for rectangle

Strictly speaking, this rectangle, or empty set, doesn’t have any edges.  It is an infinitely extended no-thing. Now, we cleave this space:

Image result for rectangle with circles inside

So now we have two spaces, “all that inside the circle, and all outside it” (Farrell 126). All of the space outside the circle will be the interior of space 1, designated as a topological “o” superscript above the Φ.  But since the rectangle goes on forever, what we really have is this:

Related image

(1) Φ⁰

The space inside the circle is another interior, (2) Φ⁰.

And the common surface between the two, designated with an alpha

ɑΦ₁₂

Now let’s look at what just happened.  Remember we still have our empty hyperset (Φ).  We now have three derivatives: the space outside the circle, the space inside the circle, and the common surface between the two.  Thus,

Φ = (1) Φ⁰, (2) Φ⁰, and ɑΦ₁₂

Therefore, 1 = 3.  I’m going to take this model in a radically different direction than does Farrell. He thinks this model represents an earlier way of thinking about the cosmos that predated Yahwist traditions. I’m skeptical of that claim, as some of Farrell’s positions have come under attack.

But the model itself is quite powerful, and it explains a way of looking at some difficult sayings by St Maximus the Confessor.

“According to St. Maximus, God is “identically a monad and a triad.” Capita theologica et oeconomica2, 13; P.G. 90, col. 1125A.He is not merely one and three; he is 1=3 and 3=1. That is to say, here we are not concerned with number as signifying quantity: absolute diversities cannot be made the subjects of sums of addition; they have not even opposition in common. If, as we have said, a personal God cannot be a monad — if he must be more than a single person — neither can he be a dyad. The dyad is always an opposition of two terms, and, in that sense, it cannot signify an absolute diversity. When we say that God is Trinity we are emerging from the series of countable or calculable numbers. St. Basil appears to express this idea well: “For we do not count by way of addition, gradually making increase from unity to plurality, saying ‘one, two, three’ or ‘first, second, third.’ ‘I am the first and I am the last,’ says God (Isaiah 44:6). And we have never, even unto our own days, heard of a second God. For in worshipping ‘God of God’ we both confess the distinction of persons and abide by the Monarchy.” De spiritu sancto18; P.G. 32, col. 149B. The procession of the Holy Spirit is an infinite passage beyond the dyad, which consecrates the absolute (as opposed to relative) diversity of the persons. This passage beyond the dyad is not an infinite series of persons but the infinity of the procession of the Third Person: the Triad suffices to denote the Living God of revelation. St. Gregory of Nazianzus, Or. 23 (De pace 3), 10; P.G. 35, col. 1161. Or. 45 (In sanctum pascha); P.G. 36, col. 628C.If God is a monad equal to a triad, there is no place in him for a dyad. Thus the seemingly necessary opposition between the Father and the Son, which gives rise to a dyad, is purely artificial, the result of an illicit abstraction. Where the Trinity is concerned, we are in the presence of the One or of the Three, but never of two.

When we speak of the Personal God, who cannot be a monad, and when, bearing in mind the celebrated Plotinian passage in the works of St. Gregory of Nazianzus, we say that the Trinity is a passage beyond the dyad and beyond its pair of opposed terms, “The monad is set in motion on account of its richness; the dyad is surpassed, because Divinity is beyond matter and form; perfection is reached in the triad, the first to surpass the composite quality of the dyad, so that the Divinity neither remains constrained nor expands to infinity.” St. Gregory of Nazianzus, Or. 23 (De pace3), 8; P.G. 35, col. 1160C. See also Or. 29 (Theologica3), 2; P.G. 36, col. 76B.  (Lossky, “The Procession of the Holy Spirit in Orthodox Theology”)

But back to Farrell’s argument.  Because the above model is written in quasi-mathematical terms, and because it couldn’t exist without a conscious observer (or Mind), this means we have an information-creating system.  This is a system that doesn’t reduce to a closed cosmos (and thus Aristotle is false).

Farrell says the hermetic occultist Giordano Bruno was advocating something like that.  Maybe. The problem is that Bruno couched all of it in what we call New Age terminology, and that’s partly why he got burned at the stake.  There might have been another reason why he got burned: he advocated a way of approaching the world, and particularly finance, that attacked the Aristotelian and (ironically) usurious system of the Venetians.  Bruno thought he could tap into the primordial medium.

Excursus:  Is it possible to tap into this medium?

Let’s say some sort of “zero-point” medium exists.  Is it possible to tap into it and should we? I think it is possible, but I think it is very dangerous to do so.  This might explain the phenomena behind remote viewing. The mind is a non-local entity (and that’s good Christian doctrine).  Therefore, it is somehow connected with this Medium, or at least it has access to it.

I think it is kind of like looking through the Palantir in Lord of the Rings.  Other entities are also using it and you could accidentally open a gateway.

Another problem with Bruno’s interpretation of the Medium is that he saw the descending forms as mutable gods.  There are two legitimate ways to respond to Bruno: say that Plato’s forms aren’t gods but rather pockets of mathematical information.  That is what the physicist Werner Heisenberg argued. We could also say that yes, indeed, they are gods. They are the fallen beney elohim.  That also does an end-run around Farrell’s use of Babylonian entities in the Cosmic War and Giza Death Star Destroyed.