Kline, Meredith. Kingdom Prologue: Genesis Foundations for a Covenantal Worldview. Two Age Press.
This is the cornerstone of Kline’s work, and any criticism of Kline must answer this work. Like all of Kline’s work, it is brilliant, engaging, and controversial. Kline anticipated numerous developments in biblical theology, especially as they relate to man as vice-regent and covenant theology.
We can summarize this book around Creation, Common Grace, and Covenant.
Structure of the Covenant
The covenant began by acknowledging the covenant lord by name, followed by a historical survey of his previous dealings with the vassal (22). Genesis 1-2 doesn’t have a preamble as such, but the covenant Lord does identify himself.
It “denotes an event at a ‘beginning’ time that preceded the episodes delineated in verses 2ff” (24). A heaven already existed prior to God’s dividing the waters, which means “heaven,” albeit a created heaven, is not identical to “the sky.” This act of creating the heavens in verse 2 included the sun and stars, which would receive their thematic treatment on Day 4.
The creation account doesn’t have any sense of “war” or struggle (26). Indeed, it was “royal construction” (27). He doesn’t use tools. “The word of his will is his all-effective instrument” (29). Creation week reveals God’s building his cosmic house. The Sabbath is his enthronement (35). Cf. Isa. 66:1; 1 Chr. 28:2. Hebrews 4 notes a parallel between Israel’s dominion-rest and Yahweh’s Sabbath rest.
It is important to note that while Kline is setting the stage for his controversial “framework theory,” that is not the main point of this argument.
Unlike many popular accounts of common grace, Kline actually works through it. Too often, especially in neo-Kuyperian circles, common grace is used as a mantra to justify what one already likes about the current order. To be fair, Kuyper himself did anchor it in the Noahic Covenant, and Kline will do so as well.
To understand Kline’s view of common grace, we need to see the difference between the Kingdom City (Metapolis) and the City of Man. Megapolis is not exactly the city of man. It is the earthly sphere. Metapolis is the kingdom city. As Kline notes, it has “undergone eschatological metamorphosis at the hands of the Omega-Spirit” (100). It is the temple of God’s presence.
Kline’s account of common grace is far more robust than neo-Kuyperian accounts. He notes that “common grace and common curse are correlative to each other (154). Without a common curse, it is not clear why one would need common grace. I think this is the point Klaas Schilder was trying to make against Abraham Kuyper. Schilder was never clear about it, though. The goal of common grace is to provide an interim for the gospel to work (155).
All of this is good and few Reformed would disagree. Kline takes this fact and expounds a new concept: the common. Everything that is not sacred space is the common. The common opens the door for “holy redemptive history” (156).
Therefore, the non-common, the holy, is “the kingdom-intrusion.” It is the anticipation of the final redemptive judgment (158). This means in our modern civil government “we always have the responsibility, whether dealing with…laws of community life, to distinguish which features of Israelite law were peculiarly theocratic (or typologically symbolic) and which are still normative in our present nontheocratic situation (159).
Not surprisingly, Kline pushes back against Kuyperians and “neo-Dooyeweerdians,” particularly the desire to identify creation in a “monistic fashion with the kingdom of God” (171). Although there are not many Dooyeweerdians today, there is a tendency to desire theocracy of some sort. Far from being a liberal, Kline’s vision of the state is quite conservative, almost libertarian at times. The state “is not redemptive. Accordingly, the state as an institutional embodiment of common grace is not designed to provide ultimate and complete solutions for malfunctioning society” (178).
This means the state has to be “non-confessional” (179). If the state is about justice, not justification, then the point of the state is not religion.
Covenant of Works
The covenant of works safeguards the principle of “do this and live.” This is in sharp contrast with the covenant of grace. Kline’s argument is that muting the works principle in the Adamic covenant creates a continuum between works and grace. Pressed hard enough, the gospel is not seen as purely gracious (108).
Most Reformed would agree with him on this point. Kline’s more controversial move, albeit not without precedent in the Reformed tradition, is applying the words principle on a typological basis to the Mosaic economy of Israel. He is not saying Israel earned eternal life by works. Rather, the works principle of Leviticus 18:5 must obtain. Kline’s argument at the surface level is simple: if the Mosaic economy was purely one of grace, then why did Israel get rejected from the land?
Analysis and Conclusion
I do not think anyone fully agrees with Kline. I do think he is a far more important thinker than many of his critics believe. Some might not like his republication of the covenant of works, but it does have precedent in the Reformed world. Even if one were to finally reject Kline on that point, his analysis forced Reformed people to think more rigorously on the covenant of works, especially in light of the Federal Vision heresy.
His take on common grace might be more difficult. As it stands, this is not the traditional Reformed view on the civil magistrate. That needs to be stated. On the other hand, most NAPARC ministers are not lobbying Congress to reinstate the Solemn League and Covenant. Moreover, I don’t think Reformed theocrats have fully worked out what it means to institute case laws in today’s world. It is not as simple as banning abortion (the outlawing of which is justifiable on natural law grounds). It is not as simple as promoting the sanctity of marriage (also natural law).
The references to natural law, which, surprisingly, Kline himself does not seem to employ, illustrate why this debate has always been difficult in Reformed circles. It is tempting to identify “neutral” with “common.” Man cannot be neutral before God. Man can live in common areas, though. That is undeniable.
For my own part, if Kline’s position is wedded to a robust natural law ethic, I think it is sustainable. It avoids some of the disasters of antinomianism while avoiding any kind of legalism. Although this is an important book, I do not think it is Kline’s best book. Moreover, this review did not touch on all the rich typological insights. Those insights, if studied carefully, will richly repay one’s study.