Fesko, J. V. Reforming Apologetics: Retrieving the Classic Reformed Approach to Defending the Faith. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2019.
There is no way to write a review of this book that minimizes the potential for a literary bloodbath. I will start by stating the thesis in the most minimal of terms. This allows me to divide the review in three parts: 1) how the Reformed orthodox viewed prolegomena and natural theology; 2) overlap between classic Reformed and Van Tillian methods; 3) disagreements with Van Til.
Side bar: I’ve read James Anderson’s series of reviews on this book. Anderson agrees with much of Fesko’s presentation of natural law and common notions. He does a good job outlining Fesko’s position.
The hero of this book is the Puritan Anthony Burgess. From Burgess, Fesko presents an eloquent and compelling account of the importance of the book of nature and “common notions.” The law of nature is the common notions which are on our hearts (Fesko 15). For Burgess, the boundary of the law of nature is “the moral law delivered by Moses at Sinai” (16).
Aquinas: the principles of natural law are the same for all people. The conclusions they draw are not (Aquinas, ST Ia-IIae, qu. 94, quoted in Fesko 34). As Fesko, commenting elsewhere on Turretin, notes, “Immediate principles admit, but the noetic effects of sin due to the fall corrupt mediate principles” (43).
Although the chapter on Calvin explains Calvin’s views, it serves an equally important function: it rebuts the “Christological monism” that tempted historians and apologists for the last 200 years. That’s where people seek a unifying principle and deduce the rest of doctrine from it. This really only works with German idealism. In short, Calvin did not see Christ as the unifying principle of all theology and then deduced everything from him.
Following Richard Muller and others, Fesko notes that scholasticism was simply a method. It involved lectio, meditatio, and quaestio/disputatio. It was a classroom format. You can find elements of it in Calvin. Contrast the Beveridge translation of 1.16.9 with the Battles translation and you can see Calvin use scholastic terminology and methods.
I am not going to spend much time on Fesko’s analysis of Calvin. The literature is overwhelming. I do not think Calvin is a Thomist, yet it is obvious that Calvin is not saying what Van Til thinks he is saying.
Regarding Thomas Aquinas, Fesko’s main complaint is that Van Til gave nearly zero evidence that he actually read Thomas. Perhaps he did. That does not come out in his writings. We will cut a few moves off at the pass. According to presuppositionalists, Thomas is wrong for trying to synthesize Aristotle with Christ. However, it is not clear why Thomas is wrong for using concepts from Aristotle, yet it is fine for Van Til to use even more dubious concepts from Kant.
Regarding some of Thomas’s arguments, Fesko notes they are quia, not propter quid. In other words, they reason from effect to the cause, not cause to the effect. This is important because we cannot know God in his essence; therefore, we cannot reason from God to the world (78ff).
My favorite chapter is the one on worldview. There is a sense in which worldview talk is legitimate. If by it one means a way of viewing the world, then there is no big problem. That is not how it is used in the literature. Historic worldview theory (what Fesko labels HWT) seeks to deduce our understanding of reality from a single principle and provide an exhaustive (or near enough) explanation of reality (98).
Not surprisingly, Van Til embraces HWT. It provides “the true interpretation of human experience” (Van Til, CA, 38, quoted in Fesko 106). This aspect of Van Til’s is fairly uncontroversial, so I will forgo the rest of the quotations. The problem is that if HWT is true, then there really cannot be any common notions between believer and unbeliever.
James Anderson, though, has demonstrated that Van Til held to common notions, at least in theory. Van Til rejected this later on (My Credo, JA, 21). There he moved to common ground, by which he meant the image of God.
Conclusion of the chapter: if one holds to HWT as defined above, then there is no legitimate place for natural revelation and common notions. Moreover, Scripture itself does not say that men will have unique knowledge regarding creation. God specifically tells Job there are a number of things that he will not know (Job 40:4).
I am tempted to skip the section on transcendental arguments. Fesko does not disagree with them in theory. He says they can be useful when you find the rare unbeliever who has a coherent worldview.
He includes a chapter on Dooyeweerd. I predicted in 2005 that there would be a return to Dooyeweerd’s thought in the Reformed world. It was a strange prediction, as Dooyeweerd is often incomprehensible. It turned out to be true, though.
To some extent for Van Til, but largely for Dooyeweerd, historic Christian thought has been plagued by the nature-grace dualism. This occurs when man absolutizes one of the modal spheres, usually the temporal one. Fesko counters this charge by noting a) Dooyeweerd mistakes duality for dualism, b) provides little analysis with the key sources, and c) uses a similar methodology to Adolf von Harnack.
Against this dualism, Dooyeweerd suggests the biblical ground motive of “creation, fall, and redemption.” Here we run into a problem. Dooyeweerd had elsewhere criticized Van Til for being too rationalist in getting his ideas from the Bible. For Dooyeweerd, we cannot use the bible as an object of theology. The problem, one among many, of which Dooyeweerd seems unaware, is that he got his biblical ground motive from the Bible!
Moreover, it is not true that Thomas Aquinas (and by extension the WCF) held to such a dualism regarding body and soul. For Thomas, the soul in-forms the body. It is the form of the body. It is not a ghost in the machine. It is one organic unity. Dooyeweerd mistook Thomas for Descartes.
And Dooyeweerd does not apply the same criticism to Calvin. Calvin specifically praised Plato on the soul (ICR, 1.15.16)! Calvin is not this pure font of only biblical theology. Even worse, Calvin said it was okay to start with the knowledge of man. The ordo docendi is not the same as the ordo essendi.
When we say that Dooyeweerd used the same methodology that Harnack did, we are not saying that he was a liberal who held the same beliefs. Rather, both believed that pure Christiant thought was corrupted by Greek philosophy.
In his concluding chapter on epistemology, Fesko shows how Van Tillians and classical Reformed can work together. Fesko’s comments on covenant sound very Van Tillian. Man’s covenantal origin allows us to embrace the book of nature.
With Van Tillians, we agree that epistemology is about wisdom (Fesko 198). Man submits to God’s authority, remembers his law, and responds with praise. We see a good example of this in Psalm 19.
Forgetting God’s law is the opposite of knowing. It is the same as disobedience. Van Til could have written this section.
There is one category confusion, though, that many Van Tillians make.They confuse axiology (the theory of value) with epistemology. An unbeliever will almost always have the wrong axiology. That does not mean he will have the wrong epistemology.
This book should not be seen as an attack on Van Til. The chapters on historic Reformed methodology are beyond dispute. The Reformed used the book of nature and believed in common notions. Nor is this book uncritical of Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas was wrong on the donum superadditum. Finally, the real criticisms of Van Til should be appreciated for what they are. Van Til did not engage in serious historical analysis. That does not mean the rest of his project is wrong. Fesko even thinks the Transcendental Argument has its place (although I have my concerns).