Roscellin: confirmed anti-realist. This view led him to declare that every existent thing is a unique individual: so-called universals are “mere words.” (Muller 26).
The problem with Boethuis’s definition of person: The definition ultimately poses all manner of problems for the doctrines of Trinity and Christ when the concept of individual substance is taken to indicate a unique entity essentially distinct from other similar entities” (27).
Anselm on Human nature: Human nature refers to the conjunction of the several properties and predicates that identify the nature, generally considered, as human—and this is prior to the more particular consideration of the single person as human, as participating in human nature. (27)
Anselm on Filioque: followed standard Augustinian line that the processions::psychological love
- As for the Greek claim that the concept of double procession resulted in the error of two ultimate principles in the Godhead, Anselm could respond that just as the creation of the world by all three persons does not result in a theory of three ultimate principles, so does the procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son not result in a theory of two principles: for the three persons create as one God, and the Father and the Son are one God in the procession of the Spirit (Muller)
Difficulty of Defining “Person.”
Alexander of Hales: good is self-diffusive. bonum est diffusivum sui. “Thus, the “distinction” of the persons in the one divine essence is the “difference of relation or of mode of existing” that arises “by reason of origin.’ (Muller 39). Further, “Thus, according to Alexander, distinction in God between essence and person is not a real distinction (secundum rem), but only a distinction of the rational intellect (secundum intelligentiam rationis); nonetheless, the distinction between persons is real even in God
Alexander objects to the claim that the distinction between persons and essence or between relations and the divine substance must either be according to substance or such as subsists between a thing and another thing (secundum rem) or merely according to our intellect (secundum intellectum solum). The first distinction would rule out divine simplicity, the latter would render the Trinity a doctrine fashioned in the human mind. Alexander responds that, in its inward economy, the one and same divine essence, is disposed as Father, who is neither generated nor proceeded from another; as Son, who is generated from another; and as Spirit, who proceeds from both—and that this manner or mode of being is “not merely according to the acceptation of out understanding, but in fact according to the thing itself.” Thus the Godhead must be considered both in terms of “the identity of substance” and in terms of “a disposition according to the consideration of origin or first principle”—in the first instance, there is the essential identify of the divine persons, in the second, there is the disposition or plurality of the Godhead according to “the predicament of relation” (40)
Latin authors preferred to speak of the Father as principium rather than cause, unlike the Greeks. An efficient cause, for example, is perceived of as a different substance than its effects (Muller 47)!
Aquinas’s denial of real distinction is a denial of a substantial distinction. He wants to deny that any distinction that would make the essence one “thing” and the “persons” other “things.”
Attributes do not result in a conceptual opposition. Relations do.
Early Reformation Doctrine of Trinity
Structure of the Book
Clarifying medieval discussions on filioque: all Westerns agreed that the Spirit proceeded from Father and Son as from one principia. Causal language was eventually abandoned, for it implied the Son/Spirit to be of a different substance (effects are not the same substance as causes). Further, and right before the Reformation, the Trinitarian life ad intra was lining up with the work ad extra (Muller 59).
The Reformation forced thinkers to restate the doctrine of the Trinity anew. Advances in historical criticism and typology meant that some exegesis needed revisiting. Muller notes three basic issues: the inheritance of Patristic vocabulary, renewed exegetical battles against the Socinians, and a new philosophical vocabulary (62).
Subordination: talk of Christ’s subordination referred to his mediatorial kingdom, when he handed it over to the Father (115).
The Terms of Trinitarian Orthodoxy
Trinitas: equivalent to Trium Unitas: “the subject itself, in its primary definition, denies composition in the Godhead” (169). God is not unitary, but unum; not triplex, but trinum.
Substantia, essentia, ousia: with regard to substance, the individual is primary and the genus secondary in the ontic sense. A genus will always be the predicate of a primary. We would say “Simon is a man” and not “man is a simon.”
Keckerman: essence is the whatness or quiddity, substance the existing individual.
Tertullian: a persona is identified by one who has substantia (178).
Socinians: person is identified with primary essence, which would yield three gods. This allowed them to exclude Son and HS from Godhood.
Turretin: person is an individual intellectual suppositum (III.xxiii.7). See 2 Cor. 1:11.
Proprietates, relationes, and notiones:
Property: a distinguishing characteristic of a subsistence not shared with other subsistences (187).
Notio: the way in which the three subsistences are distinct from one another.
The Trinity of Persons in their Unity and Distinction: Theology and Exegesis in the Older Reformed Tradition
Calvin: (see mainly Institutes 1.13.1).
Bullinger: Decades 4.3
Musculus: essence signifies that which is common; substance that which is proper to all persons. Musculus follows Hilary and Jerome where substance is hypostasis, rather than ousia (Muller 206).
Order and Distinction of the Persons
Keckermann: the mode of God’s existence does not differ from the mode of God’s essence. The persons are distinct not by degree, state, or dignity, but by the order, number, and manner of doing (Trelcatius).
Objection: does essential identity demand personal identiy? The Reformed generally respond that this is true for finite essences (Muller 211). The orthodox are slowly moving away from the old Cappadocian argument of three men having the essence of manness. The problem is that this moves from “genus (man” to “Genus (God)”, yet God isn’t a genus.
Nor is it a quaternity: the three persons plus the one essence. Persons and essence are not distinct as a thing (res).
Exegetical Issues and Trajectories
The Reformers assumed a hermeneutic of movement from shadow and promise to fulfillment (214).
The Deity and Person of the Father
Covenant of redemption:
Eternal decree and election of Christ. God works either by his decree or the execution of it (Perkins). As the Reformed saw that this was Trinitarian, they began to see the covenant of redemption.
The order of the persons ad intra in the opera personalia is mirrored ad extra in the opera appropriata (Muller 268). These are modes of operation contributing to the ultimately undivided work of the Godhead ad extra. The works of the Son and Spirit terminate on their persons. By terminate we mean the terminus is paired with a fundamentum. This pair means a relation of acts bringing about relations (268). The fundamentum is the source; the terminus is the conclusion of the action constituting the relation.
Venema: “The Father being the originating–the Son the efficient–and the Holy Spirit the Perfecting cause.”
The Person and Deity of the Son
The problem of subordination: Col. 1:15 uses protokotos, not protoktistos. Lordship, not creation (Rijssen).
Generation: a communication of personal existence without any multiplication or division of essence (284).
Aseity of the Son
The issue: Calvin denies explicitly that the Son is from the Father “with respect to his eternal essence” (Muller 325). The Son is generated per Sonship, not divinity.
However, Ursinus: the essence is absolute and communicable. The person is relative and incommunicable.
Arminius rejected Calvin’s view, insisting that “Christ, as God, has both his sonship and his essence by generation” (329).
Procession of the Holy Spirit
The Reformed try to get around the asymmetry of the Father and Son generating a divine person while the Spirit does not, in the following way: “in modo, since the way of generation terminates not only in the personalitas of the Son but also in a ‘similitude’, according to which the Son is called the image of the Father, and according to which the Son receives the property of communicating that essence to another person. In contrast, the Spirit does not receive the property of communicating that essence to another person, inasmuch as the way of spiration terminates only in the personalitas of the Spirit and not in a similitude of the Father
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